Threat Brief - 2026-02-15
Threat Brief — Saturday, February 15, 2026
Executive Summary
BeyondTrust CVE-2026-1731 hit CISA KEV and is actively exploited within 24 hours of PoC release—hunt for WebSocket/portal enumeration now. Microsoft disclosed a new ClickFix variant using nslookup for DNS-based payload staging that delivers ModeloRAT. Lazarus continues poisoning npm/PyPI with fake blockchain job offers.
1. BeyondTrust RS/PRA Pre-Auth RCE
🔴 Critical · Remote Code Execution · CVE-2026-1731 (CVSS 9.9) · PoC Available
Pre-authentication OS command injection in BeyondTrust Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access. Attackers abuse get_portal_info to extract x-ns-company value before establishing a WebSocket channel for RCE. WatchTowr and GreyNoise confirm in-the-wild exploitation less than 24 hours after PoC.
Sources: The Hacker News · GreyNoise
TTPs
| Technique | Tactic | Observable |
|---|---|---|
| T1190 | Initial Access | HTTP requests to /api/client/portal_info or similar BeyondTrust endpoints |
| T1059 | Execution | OS command injection via crafted HTTP requests |
| T1071.001 | C2 | WebSocket connections post-exploitation |
IOCs
- 86% of recon from single IP using commercial VPN (Frankfurt provider)
- Scanning operations rapidly added CVE-2026-1731 checks to existing toolkit
Detection
Log Sources: Web server access logs, WAF, BeyondTrust application logs, network traffic
Logic:
# Hunt for portal enumeration
index=web sourcetype=access_* (uri_path="*portal_info*" OR uri_path="*get_portal*")
| stats count by src_ip, uri_path, status
| where count > 10
# WebSocket establishment post-portal query
index=network dest_port=443 (http.request.uri="*websocket*" OR tcp.flags.syn=1)
| transaction src_ip maxspan=60s
| search eventcount > 5
Existing Coverage:
- None specific (gap) — generic web exploitation rules may trigger
Action
🔴 Patch immediately. If running BeyondTrust RS 21.3-25.3.1 or PRA 22.1-24.x, apply BT26-02 patches now. Hunt for portal enumeration attempts.
2. DNS-Based ClickFix Attack (ModeloRAT/Lumma Stealer)
🔴 Critical · Social Engineering + Malware Delivery · No CVE · Active Campaigns
Microsoft disclosed new ClickFix variant using nslookup against external DNS servers to retrieve payloads from TXT records. Bypasses web request monitoring by blending into DNS traffic. Delivers ModeloRAT (Python RAT) and Lumma Stealer via CastleLoader.
Sources: The Hacker News · Microsoft
TTPs
| Technique | Tactic | Observable |
|---|---|---|
| T1204.002 | Execution | User runs command via Windows Run dialog |
| T1059.001 | Execution | cmd.exe → nslookup with hardcoded external DNS server |
| T1071.004 | C2 | DNS queries to attacker-controlled nameservers |
| T1059.006 | Execution | Python-based ModeloRAT execution |
| T1547.001 | Persistence | LNK file in Windows Startup folder |
IOCs
azwsappdev[.]com— Payload hosting (ZIP archive)- Hardcoded external DNS servers (not system resolver)
- VBScript launching ModeloRAT
Detection
Log Sources: Sysmon (ProcessCreate, NetworkConnect), DNS logs, PowerShell logs
Logic:
# Nslookup to non-standard DNS server
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*nslookup.exe"
| regex CommandLine="nslookup.*\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}"
| where NOT match(CommandLine, "(8\.8\.8\.8|8\.8\.4\.4|1\.1\.1\.1)")
# CMD spawning nslookup then PowerShell
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| transaction ParentProcessId maxspan=30s
| search Image="*cmd.exe*" Image="*nslookup.exe*" Image="*powershell.exe*"
Existing Coverage:
- Nslookup PowerShell Download Cradle (Sigma) ✅
- Nslookup PowerShell Download Cradle - ProcessCreation (Sigma) ✅
- DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App (Splunk ESCU) ✅
- Cisco Secure Firewall - Lumma Stealer Activity (Splunk ESCU) ✅
Action
🔴 Hunt for nslookup with external DNS. Microsoft detects as Trojan:Win32/ClickFix.R!ml. Look for LNK files in Startup folders pointing to VBScript.
3. Lazarus npm/PyPI Supply Chain Campaign
🔴 Critical · Supply Chain Compromise · No CVE · Active Since May 2025
North Korea-linked Lazarus Group poisoning npm/PyPI with 25+ malicious packages using fake blockchain recruitment (Veltrix Capital). Social engineering via LinkedIn/Facebook/Reddit job offers. Packages deploy token-authenticated RAT with file exfil capabilities.
Sources: The Hacker News · ReversingLabs
TTPs
| Technique | Tactic | Observable |
|---|---|---|
| T1195.002 | Initial Access | Malicious npm/PyPI packages as dependencies |
| T1566.003 | Initial Access | Spearphishing via social platforms (LinkedIn, Reddit) |
| T1059.007 | Execution | JavaScript malware disguised as *.pdf.js |
| T1041 | Exfiltration | HTTP POST with token-based auth to C2 |
IOCs
Malicious npm packages: graphalgo, graphorithm, graphstruct, bigmathutils (10k+ downloads), terminal-kleur, graphflux, graphhub, graphrix
Malicious PyPI packages: graphalgo, graphex, graphlibx, bigpyx, bignum, bigmathutils
Indicators:
- Fake company: Veltrix Capital
- GitHub orgs with “blockchain” coding assessments
- Token-based C2 authentication (Jade Sleet TTP)
- MetaMask extension detection
Detection
Log Sources: Package manager logs, EDR, network traffic
Logic:
# npm/pip install of known malicious packages
index=endpoint (process="*npm*" OR process="*pip*")
| regex CommandLine="(graphalgo|bigmathutils|graphflux|terminal-kleur|graphrix)"
# JavaScript with double extension
index=sysmon EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*.pdf.js"
# MetaMask enumeration
index=sysmon EventCode=1 CommandLine="*metamask*" CommandLine="*extension*"
Existing Coverage:
- Outdated Dependency Alert Disabled (Sigma) — partial
- None specific for these packages (gap)
Action
🔴 Audit dependencies. Run npm audit / pip-audit. Block or alert on packages listed above. Educate developers on fake recruiter campaigns.
4. CANFAIL Malware Targeting Ukraine
🟡 High · Espionage · No CVE · Russian-Linked APT
Google GTIG attributes CANFAIL malware to suspected Russian intelligence. Targeting Ukrainian defense, energy, government. Actor uses LLMs for reconnaissance and lure generation. Phishing impersonates Ukrainian energy orgs.
Sources: The Hacker News · Google Cloud Blog
TTPs
| Technique | Tactic | Observable |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.002 | Initial Access | Google Drive links in phishing emails |
| T1059.007 | Execution | Obfuscated JavaScript (.pdf.js) |
| T1059.001 | Execution | PowerShell dropper → memory-only execution |
| T1204.001 | Execution | User executes RAR archive content |
| T1102 | C2 | WebSocket-based trojan communication |
IOCs
- RAR archives via Google Drive links
- JavaScript files with double extension (*.pdf.js)
- Fake Ukrainian energy company domains
- LLM-generated phishing lures
Detection
Log Sources: Email gateway, Sysmon, PowerShell logs
Logic:
# RAR extraction followed by JS execution
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| transaction ParentProcessId maxspan=60s
| search (Image="*WinRAR*" OR Image="*7z*") Image="*wscript*"
# Memory-only PowerShell (no -File parameter)
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*powershell.exe"
| where NOT match(CommandLine, "-File")
| where match(CommandLine, "-e|EncodedCommand|FromBase64")
Existing Coverage:
- Suspicious PowerShell Download (Sigma) ✅
- Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution (Sigma) ✅
Action
🟡 Hunt if in-scope. Relevant for orgs supporting Ukraine or in defense/energy sectors. Look for Google Drive links in phishing leading to RAR→JS→PowerShell chains.
5. macOS MacSync Stealer via Claude/Google Ads
🟡 High · Info Stealer · No CVE · ClickFix Social Engineering
Campaign abuses Google Ads and Anthropic Claude artifacts to deliver MacSync stealer. 15,000+ users exposed. Uses ClickFix technique to trick users into running Terminal commands. Targets keychain, browser data, crypto wallets.
Sources: CyberPress · Moonlock Lab
TTPs
| Technique | Tactic | Observable |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.008 | Resource Dev | Malvertising via Google Ads |
| T1204.002 | Execution | User pastes Base64 command into Terminal |
| T1059.002 | Execution | osascript piped command execution |
| T1555 | Cred Access | Keychain credential theft |
| T1041 | Exfiltration | HTTP POST with chunked uploads |
IOCs
a2abotnet[.]com/dynamic— C2 servera2abotnet[.]com/gate— Data exfil endpointraxelpak[.]com— Payload hostingapple-mac-disk-space.medium[.]com— Fake Apple article/tmp/osalogging.zip— Staging file
Detection
Log Sources: macOS Unified Logs, EDR, network traffic
Logic:
# Curl piped to osascript
process where process.name == "osascript" and process.parent.name == "curl"
# Base64 decode in Terminal context
process where process.name == "base64" and process.args : "-d"
and process.parent.name in ("Terminal", "bash", "zsh")
# Network to known C2
dns.query.name : ("a2abotnet.com", "raxelpak.com")
Existing Coverage:
- JXA In-memory Execution Via OSAScript (Sigma) ✅
- Clipboard Data Collection Via OSAScript (Sigma) ✅
- MacOS AMOS Stealer - VM Check Activity (Splunk ESCU) ✅
Action
🟡 Block IOCs at perimeter. Add a2abotnet[.]com and raxelpak[.]com to blocklists. Educate users about fake “DNS resolver” or “disk analyzer” prompts.
6. CISA KEV Additions (Feb 12-14)
🟡 High · Multiple Products · Active Exploitation
CISA added 4 vulnerabilities to KEV catalog. Notable: Notepad++ supply chain attributed to China-linked Lotus Blossom (Chrysalis backdoor).
| CVE | Product | CVSS | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-20700 | Apple iOS/macOS | 7.8 | Memory corruption, targeted spyware delivery |
| CVE-2025-15556 | Notepad++ | 7.7 | Update hijack → Chrysalis backdoor (Lotus Blossom) |
| CVE-2025-40536 | SolarWinds WHD | 8.1 | Auth bypass, used in lateral movement campaigns |
| CVE-2024-43468 | Microsoft SCCM | 9.8 | SQL injection (patched Oct 2024, now actively exploited) |
Detection
Log Sources: Endpoint telemetry, software inventory, web logs
Existing Coverage:
- Notepad++ Updater DNS Query to Uncommon Domains (Sigma) ✅
- Suspicious Child Process of GUP.Exe (Sigma) ✅
- Windows Sqlservr Spawning Shell (Splunk ESCU) ✅
Action
🟡 Verify patch status. Federal agencies must remediate by March 5, 2026. Hunt for SolarWinds WHD exploitation if internet-exposed. Check Notepad++ update integrity.
Priority Actions
- 🔴 BeyondTrust CVE-2026-1731 — Patch RS/PRA immediately; hunt for
get_portal_infoprobes - 🔴 ClickFix DNS staging — Hunt for
nslookupto external DNS servers followed by PowerShell - 🔴 Lazarus npm/PyPI — Audit for malicious packages: graphalgo, bigmathutils, graphflux family
- 🟡 macOS MacSync — Block
a2abotnet[.]comandraxelpak[.]com; educate users on Terminal paste attacks - 🟡 CISA KEV — Verify SCCM, SolarWinds WHD, Notepad++ patch status; hunt for Chrysalis indicators